







Inflation is currentlyjudged to be the Ameri-
can economy's number-one problem by Presi-
dent Carter, Chairman Volcker, and most other
prominent government officials, not to mention
the American public. And reducinginflation, of
course, is a primary goal of Federal Reserve
policy. Clearly, then, the development of an
effective anti-inflation policy is a crucial issue.
In order to address this issue, one must first
analyze the nature of the inflation process itself,
as well as the underlying economic causes of
inflation. This is theaim ofthe presentpaper. We
will evaluate the available theoreticalandempir-
ical evidence on the causes and costs ofinflation
as well as onthe costsofanti-inflation policy. We
will then use the results ofthis analysis to deter-
mine which anti-inflation policy has the most
reasonable chance of sustained success.
To this end, in Section I we employ a simple
macroeconomic analysis to present comparable
statements of both monetary and cost-push (or
income-share) theories ofinflation. On the basis
of that analysis, we conclude that all these
theories require an accompanyingincreasein the
money supply in order for them to provide a
consistent account of continuing inflation. It
follows that the various theories can explain
sustained inflation, such as we haveexperienced,
only to theextentthattheycanexplainsystemat-
ic increases in the money supply.
In Section II, we use these points to discuss
what a meaningful test ofthecompetingtheories
ofinflationshould show,andevaluatetheempir-
ical evidence on these terms. We see ample
evidence there of a strong positive effect of the
monetary aggregates on the price level, but find
very littleevidencethat U.S. monetarypolicyhas
systematically reacted to accommodate cost-
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push or monopoly-pricing factors. Also, despite
mixed evidence, we find some signs ofeffects of
government spending and federal deficits on the
monetary aggregates. These results suggest that
U.S. fiscal and monetary policies have had a
substantial role in initiatingandsustaininginfla-
tion over the last two decades.
In Section III, we discuss the economic costs
of inflation. Besides increasing uncertainty and
redistributing wealth, inflation also causes peo-
ple to shift out of holding money balances into
shopping more often, stockpiling goods, and
making speculative investments-all of which
lead to inefficient allocations ofresources. Also,
because ofgovernment taxregulations writtenin
terms of nominal amounts, inflation distorts
private decisionmaking. We conclude, then, that
the costs of inflation are indeed significant.
The rest of our analysis concerns the costs of
anti-inflation policy and the choice of the best
policy to achieve that end. In Section IV, we
discuss the output-employment costs of anti-
inflation policy by considering current evidence
on the Phillips curve inflation-unemployment
tradeoff. The available evidence suggests that
significant amounts of output and unemploy-
ment would be lost under any anti-inflationary
fiscal and monetary policy. Still, it is doubtful
that alternative or additional policy actions can
avoid such costs while still slowing inflation.
In Section V we consider the implications of
this analysis for the formulation of an effective
anti-inflation policy. Here we attemptto answer
three questions facing the policymaker: 1)
Should inflation in fact be slowed? 2)What
policy instruments should be used ifwe decideto
slow inflation? and 3) How rapid a reduction in
inflation should policymakers try to attain?
The answer to the first question might seemto
be a foregone conclusion, yet it's useful to con-sider the pros and cons formally. We argue that
the costs ofinflation are considerable and recur-
ring, whereas the output costs ofstopping infla-
tion, while considerable, are temporary, and
would be almost wholly absorbed by the econo-
my within a three-to-five year period followinga
sustained effort to reduce the rate of inflation.'
In this light, thecosts ofstoppinginflationdo not
appear to outweigh the costs of inflation itself.
Also, given the substantialresponsibility offiscal
and monetary policymakers for originally caus-
inginflation, it can be argued that they should
direct their efforts toward reducing the inflation
problem today.
With respect to the second question, the im-
portanceofmonetaryfactors in initiatingand/or
sustaining inflation implies thataneffective anti-
inflation policy must include a sustained reduc-
tion in the growth rates ofthe monetary aggre-
gates. This is true even if one holds to a strict
cost-push view ofinflation. At the sametime, we
arguethattighterfiscal policyand the removalor
easing ofgovernmental regulatory burdens may
successfully augment monetary policy by miti-
gating its contractionary effects on various sec-
tors ofthe economy. However, we see no useful
role for incomes policies in our anti-inflation
strategy, partly becausethere is no clearevidence
that wage and price restraints can mitigate cost-
push forces, and partly because such policies
have historically tended to substitute for rather
than complement monetary restraint.
Finally, with respect to the third question, the
crucial issue in deciding how quickly to stop
inflation is how the costs of stopping inflation
can be least painfully imposed. Though political
forces may push for a "quick fix", the lags from
monetary policy to inflation make it impossible
to achieve an immediate reduction in the infla-
tion rate. Moreover, attempts to eliminate infla-
tion quickly would make a deep recession inevi-
table, which would tend to shift political
sentiment from fighting inflation to reducing
unemployment, and thus could lead to stimula-
tive policies and another inflationary cycle. This
strongly suggests that restrictive policies should
be implemented slowly enough to avoid a deep
recession, but resolutely enough to have some
lasting effect on inflation. That is, policymakers
must avoid expansionary temptations once their
policies begin to work in slowing inflation.
Naturally, such a passive policy course could be
politicallyunpopular, andthus hard tomaintain.
Nevertheless, it may be the only course ofaction
that can generate a sustainable reduction in
inflation without severely distorting or disrup-
ting the workings of the American economy,
I. Inflation in Macroeconomic Theory
For our purposes, theories ofinflation can be
divided into two major groupings: monetary
theories and cost-push~ormore precisely, what
Charles Schultze has called "income share"~
theories of inflation) Monetary theories cite
accelerations in the growth ofvarious monetary
aggregates as the primaryincitingandsustaining
factor in inflations. Cost-push or income-share
theories, on the other hand, stress the impor-
tance of supply factors, such as autonomous
increases in important wages or prices, in gene-
rating continuing wage-price spirals. Usually,
such autonomous increases are. said to occur
when firms or labor unions exercise their per-
ceived monopolypowerinanattempttoincrease
their profits or wage· incomes, respectively.3
Their actions subsequently lead to price and
wage increases throughout the entire economy.
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As stated here, both types ofinflation theories
provide only partialexplanationsoftheinflation
process. Monetary approaches provide a reason-
ably complete description of how the money
supply operates through demand and supply to
effect anincrease in the price level. However,the
pressures~political or otherwise~which cause
policymakers to allow the money supply to
increase in thefirst place often are notdescribed
or documented as fully as are the effects of
money on prices. On the other hand, income-
share theories generally provide descriptions of
the economic and sociological forces leadingto
cost-push behavior. However, most of these
discussions do not provide a cogent enough
analysis ofhowthemomentum ofcost-generated
wage-price spirals can continue without severe
disruptions of output and employment. Theserespective analytical problems are discussed
further below.
Economists typically define inflation as a
sustained increase in the average price level, and
thus in the money price of virtually all goods.
However, industry-specific phenomena-such
as bankruptcies, mergers, technologicaldevelop-
ment, and changes in consumer tastes orsupply
conditions-typically change prices in one in-
dustry relative to another, but do not have much
effect on the price level in general. Rather, such
relative price changes serve as signals to the
economy to shift resources among industries-
and to shift consumption habits amonggoods-
in order to promote economic efficiency. Some
prices will rise and others will fall, but prices on
average need not change at all. Under inflation,
however, the dominant characteristic is an in-
crease in virtuallyall moneyprices, with resource
shifts either non-existent or primarily due to
factors unrelated to the inflation itself. Thus,
there is a fundamental conceptual difference
between factors which lead primarily to relative
price changes and those which lead primarily to
absolute price-level changes, or inflation.4
There is also a distinction between factors
which cause continuing inflation and those
which cause only one-time movements in the
price level. Thus, some factors can have a broad
enough impact to raise the general price level
once-and-for-all, but cannot cause continuing
price increases. Therefore, these factors cannot
seriously be considered as causes of sustained
inflation such as the United States and other
countries have experienced.
Inflation has been linked to increases in the
money supply at least since the writings ofDavid
Hume some two hundred years ago.5 Thereason
is that increases in currencyanddeposit holdings
by the public serve to increase demand~andso
money prices-for all goods rather than toshift
demand from one good to another. Moreover,
an increase in the money supply serves tojn~
crease nominal demand for goods butdoes not
change underlying real supply conditions (i.e.,
technology and factor supplies). Such. an in-
crease ultimately affects only prices, without
necessarily inducing resource shifts from one
industry to another.
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Ofcourse, in the short-run, before prices have
adjusted fully, a highermoney supply will induce
higher output and employment, and other real
effects. However, these will disappear once the
economy has adjusted fully to the higher money
supply.6 Furthermore, continuing increases in
the money supply will exert continuing upward
pressure on nominal demand, and so can cause
continuing inflation.
In the days of the gold standard, monetary
analyses explained secular increases in the sup-
ply ofspecie (gold)-and thus inflation-largely
through expropriations or discoveries of gold
and silver. In modern economies with fiat mon-
ies, the supply ofcurrency and deposits is largely
under the government's control, so a complete
monetary theory of inflation must explain why
the government would, in effect, choosetoinflict
inflation on an economy by expandingthe mon-
ey supply.
One obvious explanation is thepolitical press-
ure to maintain high-employment and output
conditions. Since prices and resources are not
perfectly flexible in the real world, central banks
are constantly under pressure to insurethattheir
domestic money supply grows at least as fast as
money demand. (Otherwise, there would be
general downward pressure on prices, which
could lead todepressed businessconditionsifthe
economy did not react immediately.) In such a
case, the money supply inevitably would grow
faster than money demand, and thus impart an
inflationary bias to the economy.
Also, the lags from monetary expansion to
inflation are longer than those from monetary
expansion to increases in output. This naturally
causes conflict between those with short-term
time horizons, who are concerned with output
and employment here and now, and those with
longer horizons, who are more worried about
long-term problems such as inflation and stable
gro\vth. When short··term problems are especial-
ly pressing, or when those short-run concerns
gain superior political force, monetary expan-
sion will accelerate, thus leading to accelerated
inflation later on.
Another oft-cited explanation ofinflationary
monetary expansion is the tendency for higher
government expenditures to be financed bymoney creation rather than by higher taxes or
bond sales to the public. The higher spending
therefore leads to faster money-supply growth,
which then eventually leads toaccelerated infla-
tion. Itis important to realize that the samelevel
of government spending would be much less
inflationary when financed fully by taxes or
bond issues to the public. Higher taxes would in
effect shiftdemand from thegeneral publictothe
government, so thatthe higherspendingcould be
accomplished with a small one-time increase in
the price level. Public bond issues would either
shift demand from investors to the government,
or would tend to increase interest rates in credit
markets, in either case mitigating price rises.7
However, when moneycreationfinances govern-
ment spending, this serves to augment rather
than offset the higher government demand for
goods. What's more, the money supply will tend
to continue growing as long as spendingremains
at a high level, so thata continuing inflation can
occur.
In summary, increases in the monetary aggre-
gates can be seen to lead to the general type of
price increases which we have defined as infla-
tion. Monetary theories also cite various politi-
cal factors which can lead to the initial excessive
monetary expansion.
Income-share theories attribute inflation to
the struggles ofbusiness firms, laborunions, and
other groups to increase their share of the eco-
nomic pie. Initially, these groups attempt to
exploit their perceived monopoly power to raise
the prices oftheirgoods orservices. Whenhigher
wages raise costs and prices in an industry
and/or when higher commodity prices raise the
costs ofproducing other goods and ofmaintain-
ing living standards, other firms and unions
attempt to keep pace by raising their own prices,
which can then cause a wage-price spiral to
emerge. Various versions of this approach in-
clude cost-push, wage-push and sellers' inflation
theories, as described in the writings of John
Kenneth Galbraith, Abba Lerner, Edward Bern-
stein, and others. Similar theories cite shocks to
particular industries-such as the OPEC oil
price hike of 1973 or various crop failures-as
the first causes which raise costs and so generate
continuing inflationary spirals.8
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All the phenomena discussed in this context
are primarily sources ofrelative pricechange. By
themselves, they represent, at most, temporary
or one-time pressures on the price level. The
typical problem for these theories is to explain
how such one-time, industry-specific factors can
induce a continuing, general inflation without
disrupting equilibrium levels of output and em-
ployment.
Consider, for example, an increase inwages in
an industry due to union demands. Ifall other
wages andpricesin the economythenincrease by
like amounts in order to maintain real incomes,
real wealth will decline due to the lower purcha-
sing power of cash and other assets with fixed
money values. Therefore, demand would be
insufficient tomaintainfull-employment output,
so thateithertheprice level would fall towardsits
previous level or the economy would go into
recession. In other words, if all prices rise, but
aggregate demand conditions remain un-
changed, the new set of prices could not be an
equilibrium and so could not be sustained.
Thus, for cost-pushtypes ofdisturbances to be
a source of continuing inflation-but not of
continuing unemployment-there must be an
accompanying stimulus to aggregate demand,as
would be provided by an increasing money
supply. Accommodative monetarypolicyin such
a situationmight occurifpolicymakersincreased
the money supply in order to avoid even the
temporary losses in output and employment
resulting from inflexible prices and inputs.
Equilibrium output levels could then be main-
tained, because the increased money supply
would serve to increase the equilibrium price
level up to the level ofactual prices, and thus to
validate the higher prices.
This type of accommodating increase in the
money supplymustoccurtosustainanyinflation
triggered initially by cost-push influences. An
income-share struggle or supply shock would
provide the initial spark, and the increasing
money supply would provide the fuel to support
the continuing inflation. Though analyses ofthis
type emphasizevarious conflictsand shocks, and
hardly even mention the money supply, an ac-
commodative monetary policy nevertheless
plays an essential role in sustaining such wage-
price spirals.The debate between monetary and income-
share theories of inflation can therefore be
couched in terms of which is more effective in
explaining the actual expansion ofthe monetary
aggregates. That is, does the money supply
typically increase because of fiscal-and
monetary-policy decisions, with wage and price
increases merely symptoms of a general infla-
tionary situation-or are wage and price in-
creases typically autonomous forces, with faster
money growth validating higher prices in order
to prevent business slumps?9 An analysis ofthe
empirical evidencecan providesomeevidenceon
this issue.
II. Inflation in Fact
Since 1964, consumer-price inflation in the
United Stateshas averaged 5.75 percentperyear,
and has tended to accelerate, and manufacturing
wage rates have shown much the same behavior
(Chart 1). Relative price changes have indeed
occurred over this period, but, as documentedin
Fama and Schwert (1977), they apparently have
not been systematically related to observed infla-
tion. 1O Nor have business slumps and unemploy-
ment followed every wave of price increases, or
worsened as inflation continued. Rather, the
price level has moved inexorably upward
throughout the period, during booms and seri-
ous recessions, and during shortages and sur-
pluses for important commodities like food,
steel, and oil. In other words, we have experi-
enced a classic inflation, withactual price behav-
ior generally characterized by accelerating rates
of increase of all prices rather than by periodic
changes in a few dominant commodity prices.
Again, relative price changes and inter-industry
shocks have occurred, buthave notrepresented a
Chart 1
Changes in Money Supply and Federal Debt
Change (%)
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10dominant characteristic of the continuing U.S.
inflation.
Over this same period, the monetary
aggregates-'such as MI and Mz -have also
grown at an accelerating rate (Chart 2), as has
virtually every nominal variable that one could
name. This concomitant increase in money and
prices is consistent with our argument that the
money supply must increase for inflation to
continue. What is more impressive is the massive
amount of statistical evidence which documents
a systematic link between various money-supply
measures and price levels over a wide range of
economic experiences. For example, a recent
study found that fluctuations in the MI measure
were able to explain over 60% of quarterly
fluctuations in U.S. consumer prices over lfhe
1959-78 period. 11 Thanks to such results, econo-
mists nearly unanimously acknowledge the im-
portance of money-supply growth in sustaining
inflation.
As discussed earlier, however, these results do
not explain what factors lead totheinitialmone-
tary expansion, and so do not necessarily rule
out cost-push-cum-accommodation theories.
Still, some studies have directly addressed these
issues.
But first, it may be useful to consider some of
the more traditional evidence used to support
income-share inflation hypotheses. Overthe last
few decades, several articles have documented a
relation between various factors (such as wage
increases and changes in industrial concentra-
tion) and inflation rates, both secularly and at
various points in the cycle. IZ As Levy (1979)
points out, however, all these studies have two
serious defects: their results are not shown to be
inconsistent with a monetary theory ofinflation,
and the phenomena they cite are not shownto be
sources of autonomous shocks rather than reac-
tions to already existing inflationary forces. In
any inflation, as we have seen, all nominal
variables inevitably rise together. Therefore,
merely documenting a statistical correlation
between, say, wages and prices, does notrule out
the possibility that both are being driven by a
third factor, such as the money supply. In the
jargon ofstatistics, tests ofthe cost-push theory
have been of very low power, with little or no
ability to rule out competing hypotheses.
A meaningful way to test between monetary
and income-share theories would be to acknow-
ledge the long-run monetary nature ofinflation,
and then to analyze the factors which cause
monetary expansion, and so serve to generate or
perpetuate inflation, as the case may be. If
Chart 2

















Consumer pricesincome-share or cost-push factors have typically
been the initial causes of inflation, then there
should be a systematic effect ofthese factors On
monetary policy-andso onthe moneysupply__
ifthe process is tocontinue. Onthe otherhand,if
ambitious political programs-operating
through increased government deficits orexpan-
sionary monetary policies-have typically been
the source of money-supply growth and infla-
tion, this link too should be identifiable.
These issues have been addressedin independ-
ent work by Gordon and Bazdarich, with much
the same results. Gordon (1977) tested forcausal
effects from various cost-push or supply-shock
variables to the money supply, using data from
seven major industrialized countries overthelast
two decades. Only for the United States did he
find anysystematicevidenceofmonetaryaccom-
modation, and even this evidence was extremely
weak. 13 Over a similar period, Bazdarich tested
for monetary accommodation of wages and
prices in the Pacific Basin (1978), and for mone-
tary accommodation of a range ofcost-push or
supply-shock variables in the United States
(1979). He found no significant evidencethatthe
narrow money supply (MI) orthe monetarybase
systematically reacted to any of these factors.
The wider money-supply measure (M1) reacted
systematically only to a few highly cyclical vari-
ables, such as steel prices, which may have
tracked the cyclical nature of M 1 due to disin-
termediation and similar effects. For an over-
whelming majority of the variables, the typical
result was strong effects from the various mone-
tary aggregates to the "cost-push" measure, but
virtually no reverse effects.
In other work on the U.S. economy, Gordon
(1978) concluded that only the acceleration of
inflation in 1974 could be attributed to non-
monetary factors-in this case to food and oil-
price shocks. Still, Bazdarich (1979) found that
even this period could be reasonably well ex-
plained by 1971 ~75 money-supplygrowthandby
the 1972-73 removal of wage-price controls.14
One might argue that the twenty~yeardata
periods used in these studies are too long to pick
up thepossiblytemporaryeffects ofvariouscost-
push factors. Yet it is also true that such effects
lose reliability and applicability if they'do not
hold up over extended periods of time. For
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example, a statementthatmonetarypolicyreact-
ed to wage pressures, say in 1964, is not testable
at all, since we have only one observation-and
that was in fact already used to formulate the
hypothesis! Futhermore, even if we could prove
this assertion, it tells us little about what caused
inflation in 1978, or what will cause inflation in
1981. In other words, a theory must be general
and have predictive power if it is to have any
practical applicability, and the tests of various
versions of cost-push inflation have revealed
little evidence of these qualities.
As for the effects ofgovernment spending and
deficits, Gordon (1977) found evidence that
Vietnam War financing in the U.S. could ex-
plain some ofthe money-pricephenomenain the
U.S. and abroad in the late 1960's. Bazdarich
(1979) also found evidence ofsystematic effects
of both government spending and government
deficits on MI and M1 as suggested by Chart 2,
although these results had some unsatisfactory
features. IS In unrelated attempts to measure
money-supply "reaction functions," Barro
(1976) and others have found effects of fiscal-
policy measures and monetary-policy goal vari-
ables on various money-supply measures.
These studies identify systematic effects trans-
mitted from various measures of fiscal and
monetary policy to money-supply growth, and
thence to inflation. Yet on the same terms, they
generally fail to find such effects for cost-push
variables such as wages, unit labor costs, and
various commodity prices. Obviously,
monetary-oriented theories cannotexplainevery
wiggle in money supplies and prices, but over
extended periods oftime-over all phases ofthe
business cycle-they appearto have significantly
greater explanatory power for inflation than
cost-push or income-share th·~ories.
Still, the question may arise whether there
really is a basic distinction between the two
theories. While income-share theories cite busi-
ness and labor pressures on the central bank as
creating expansionary policies, monetary the-
ories cite political pursuit of economic goals as
leading to monetary expansion. Given the simi-
lar political undertones, does it make much
difference which description is most accurate?If
nothing else, the way in which we have contrast-
ed these theories helps to illuminate the impor-tance ofthe money supply and monetary policy
in the inflation process. Moreover, the evidence
suggests that Congress and the Federal Reserve
have been morethanmerely passiveagentsswept
along on a wave of inflation. These institutions
and the political process in which they operate
have served to generate as well as perpetuate
much ofourrecent inflation, whichis animport-
ant consideration in our later discussion ofanti-
inflation policy.
III. Economic Costs of Inflation
Economists are oftencriticized, and rightlyso,
for underestimating the costs of inflation. This
reflects the fact that most of the "costs" of
inflation recognized by thepublic either repres-
ent redistributions of wealth among different
groups, with little net cost to society, or arise
from popular misconceptions. For example, if
anincreasedmoneysupplyleadstohigherprices,
people on fixed nominal incomes, holders of
cash, and creditors will lose. On the other hand,
debtors will gain, as will also the beneficiaries of
government activities financed by the money
creation. Similarly, if inflation were caused by a
wage-push-cum-accommodation set of events,
those negotiating the higher settlement would
gain, while creditors and those onfixed incomes
would suffer. These direct gains and losses in
wealth due to inflation roughly offseteach other,
leading to a redistribution of income, but not
necessarily to a decline in national income.
Similarly, the public tends to perceive infla-
tion as causing a decline in living standards as
household incomes apparently fail to keep up
with rising prices. Again, however, real incomes
do not typically decline during inflations, and so
no loss in real purchasing power occurs for the
economy as a whole. Rather, perceived losses
typically occur because consumers believe. their
nominal incomes are rising because oftheir own
merit, and not because ofany general inflation-
aryphenomena. Thus, they believetheir $2Q,OQO
incomes would have accrued to them even if
prices had not risen, so that they see a 108S in
purchasing power compared to what they would
have had with $20,000 incomes butlowerprices.
This naturallyleads them to feel thatthey have
beencheated, despite the inconsistencies oftheir
underlying reasoning.
Economists often neglect the redistributions
of wealth and increased misperceptions that are
inherent in any real-world inflation, because
these phenomena are not important in theoreti-
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cal analyses of inflation. Still, wealth redistribu-
tions due to inflation represent returns based on
chance rather thaneffort. These thereforedistort
the public's psychological incentive to prosper
from thrift and hard work, rather than from
speculative ventures. Similarly, the "losses" in
purchasing power are real enough to families
with expectations of future prosperity. These
costs are very real to the voting public, and
cannot be as easily dismissed by policymakersas
they are by economists.
Furthermore, there are very real economic
costs imposed by inflation, some of which show
up even in theoretical analyses, and some of
which are endemic to real-world economies with
laws and contracts written in nominalterms. For
example, inflation causes individuals;to econo-
mize on cash holdings, and thus to substitute
more time shopping and barteringfor the conve-
nience of using cash or financial instruments.
The faster that prices rise, the faster money loses
its value, and so the morecostlyit is to hold. This
causes individuals to utilize inefficient means of
transaction in order to hold as little money as
possible.16 These phenomena have been deemed
"shoe leather costs of inflation", as the public
spends more time (wearing out shoes) in stores,
between stores, or waiting in line, rather than
holding more cash and spadngshopping trips
farther apart.
Similarly, busmesses typicallY attempt to
avoid taxes on inflation-expanded profits by
hiring extra accountants and tax consultants to
devise (say) exotic depreciation or tax-shelter
schemes. Furthermore, as inflation rises, the
public experiences greater losses from not antic-
ipating it correctly, and thus devotes morere-
sources to research and information on inflation
prospects and less to the production oftangible
goods. The growth of T-bill futures, GNMA
futures, and the gold market, and the growthof
various forecasting services, are testimony tothevigor of attempts to learn abotlt and hedge
against inflation. These efforts largelystemfrom
the increased variability of the inflation rate,
more than from an increased level ofinflation,
but typically, higher inflation is accompanied by
a higher variability of inflation as well. 17 These
phenomena may not lower measuredGNP,bpt
they reduce livingstandardsbydrawingvaluable
resources (viz., leisure and financialexpertise)to
socially less efficient uses.
How important are these costs? Rose (1979)
cites estimates that every one-percentage"point
rise in the inflation rate costs between $1 to $3
billion in current dollars per yearin extra trans-
action costs, or between 0.1 to 0.2 percentofreal
GNP per year. Moreover, thesecostscontinueto
accrue withcontinuinginflation.Ifwe discounta
permanent flow ofsuch costs at a 2-percentreal
rate,IS the present value of the costs of each
permanent percentage-point increase in the in-
flation rate would approximate$100 billion, or5
percent ofGNP. These are very rough estimates
of the real costs involved. Still, these costs can
clearly be enormous-probably on the same
order of magnitude as the temporary losses in
employment and output caused by an anti-
inflationary monetary policy.
Perhaps the most controversial question
about the costs ofinflation concerns its effecton
economic growth. Some economists have con-
cluded that inflation speeds growth by reducing
money holdings and so encouraging saving and
investment. Such results have typically been
obtained in models where all unconsumed out-
put necessarily went to productive investment.
However, in the real world, when inflation
causes consumers to decrease cash balancesand
consumption, they often substitute inventories
of storeable commodities or precious meta.ls
rather than productive investment. Thus,· the
growth process might be unaffected·oreven
impeded by inflation. 19
The behavior of stock prices and comrnodity
prices provide some evidence on this issue. If
higher inflation increas.esthedernandforcapita.l
investment, we would expect strong prices in
periods of accelerating inflation. However,· if
higher inflation merely encourages commodity
speculation, we would expect weak stockpI"ices
and volatile commodity prices duringstlchperi-
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ods. Gorham's (1979) findings weremixed onthe
relation between commodity prices and infla-
tion. However, they showed a strong negative
effect ofinflation on stockprices, a.nd no reliable
sign of a positive effect of inflation on invest-
ment. Moreover, a casual look at the numbers
suggests that the decade-long acceleration of
inflation has coincided with slower growth in
output and productivity.
All these costs occurevenin simpletheoretical
analyses of inflation, but many more costs of
inflation occurdueto thenominal-valueorienta-
tion of the U.S. legal system. A prominent
example is the progressive income tax, where
marginal tax rates are calibrated by dollar incre-
ments of income. If a worker's salary rises to
"keepup"withinflation,thehighersalarypushes
him into a higher tax bracket, so that a larger
fraction of his pre-tax income goes to taxes.
Thus, he is left with a lowerafter-taxreal income
despite the "cost of living" adjustment. Since
actual tax rates are not indexed regularly, infla-
tion therefore can reduce after-tax real income
for extended periods of time. Similarly, if the
nominal value ofproductive capital rises due to
inflation, the nominalrise will be treatedas a real
capital gain by the tax system and taxed accor-
dingly. Therefore, inflation systematically low-
ers the after-tax real rate ofreturn on capita1,2°
Since the government receives these extra tax
revenues, there is no immediate social loss.
However, the tax system together with inflation
lowers the effective returns to labor and capital
investment-so that this lowers the incentives to
work and invest, lowers thesuppliesoflaborand
capital to the economy, and soputsa dragonthe
growth of domestic outpUt. 21
Similar effects can occur because ofdeposit
interest-rateceilings (RegulationQ). Wheninfla-
tion pushes up nominal interest rates on other
investments, interest-rateceilings ondepositscut
off funds for deposit institutions. This serves to
restrict financing to sectors, such as housing,
which depend on a steady flow of funds to
deposit institutions. The interaction ofra.teceil-
ings and inflation thus impedes the efficient
functioning of these sectors.
To summarize, even in an ideal econorny with
full information and perfect flexibility, inflation
imposes significant costs by discouragingtheuseof money in financing transactions and other-
wise encouraging socially inefficient use of re-
sources. In addition, real-world impediments-
such as laws written in nominalterms-combine
with inflation to further distort the allocation of
resources. These costs, together withthepsycho-
logical strains caused by inflation, make infla-
tion a very expensive experience for the national
economy.
IV. The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off
Numerous and diverse costsareincurred byan
economy during inflation. On the other hand,
the costs ofstopping inflation can be charaCter-
ized mainly by the losses in output and employ-
ment which anti-inflation policies are likely to
impose. These costs can be discussed in terms of
the current economic wisdom on the Phillips
curve-the supposed inverse relationship be-
tween unemployment and inflation.
Samuelson and Solow (1960) first proposed
the Phillips curve as an instrument of policy,
partly in the belief that higher rates of inflation
would allow the economy to achieve permanent
reductions in unemployment.22 This belief
stemmed from the then-observed empirical sta-
bility ofthe Phillips relation, despite thefact that
economic theoryhad neverachieveda satisfacto-
ry explanation of why such a trade-off should
exist. However, once policymakers started to
exploit this relationship, its stability began to
disappear. High inflation rates failed to prevent
higher and higher unemployment rates from
occurring.
Friedman (1968) argued that no permanent
trade-off actually exists between inflation and
unemployment. Rather, he asserted that higher
inflation temporarily leads to higher outputand
lower unemployment solely because, during any
inflation, prices initially rise faster than people
expectthemto. Thiscausesthepublictoconfuse
the general inflation process with a higher de-
mand. and higher relative prices for the·goods
they produce, so that they respond by increasing
output and hiringmoreworkers. Oncethe public
has adjusted to the higher rates ·of inflation,
unemployment willreturn to its "natural rate",
or perhaps even to a higher natural rate due to
the distortions discussed above. Atthatpoint,an
even higher level ofinflation will be required to
again confuse the public and thence reduce un-
employment.
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Friedman asserted that a fully anticipated
inflation will not cause unemployment to drop
below normal levels, so that there is no trade-off
between anticipated inflation and unemploy-
ment, and no sustainable trade-off between
actual inflation and unemployment. These in-
sights explained not only the Phillips curve
trade-off, but also the deterioration in the trade-
off over time. Furthermore, the subsequent
acceleration in U.S. inflation concurrent with
rising unemployment insured the existence ofa
receptive audience for his ideas.
Following ten years of research on this
"natural-rate hypothesis," the economics profes-
sion has largely agreed on the importance of
inflation expectations incorrectly specifying the
Phillips curve relation.23 Economistsalso widely
acknowledge that no permanent inflation-
unemployment trade-off exists. The remaining
debate centers on three issues affe~ting the na-
ture ofthe short-run Phillipstrade-off: first, how
quickly expectations adjust to new phenomena,
specifically to changes to policy; second, how
quickly unemployment returns to its naturalrate
once expectations have adjusted; and third, how
much the natural rate varies in response to
exogenous shocks.24
The first two issues are clearly concerned with
the extent ofshort-run gains or losses in output
and employment that would accrue from a shift
in monetary and fiscal policy. The third issue is
also related, since higher (or lower) unemploy-
ment levels may persist for long periods oftime
foilowing policy shifts if the unemployment
changes represent shifts in the natural rate as
well. Therefore, estimations ofadjustment lags
which do not allow for shifts in the natural rate
could conceivably be biased upward.
Unfortunately, because expectations cannot
be observed directly, we cannoteasilydistinguish
among the three types ofadjustment lags consid-ered here. Most studies merely attetnptto esti..
mate the lag from changes in pricestochangesin
output or employment. Pigott(1979) and McEl-
hattan (1979), in evaluating these studies, both
conclude that the empirical evidence roughly
supports the long-run natural-rate hypothesis
(i.e., that there is no long-run trade-off between
unemployment and inflation), but they also find
substantial lags from changes ill policy-to
changes in inflation.25
Pigott, however, also presents a somewhat
conflicting analysis ofrecent internationalexpe-
rience. GermanyandJapan'sslowgrowthduring
the 1970's has commonlybeenattributedtotheir
anti-inflationary policies, whereas the U.S.'
faster-than-normal growth has been attributed
to aweakeranti-inflationpolicy. YetPigottfinds
outputactuallyhigh in the GermanandJapanese
economies, when compared to that in the U.K.,
Sweden, Canada, and Italy, even though these
other industrialized countries have madelittle or
no inroads into inflation. In other words, a
comparison of Germany and Japan with the
U.S. alone suggests that large output costs are
associated with slowing inflation. However, a
comparison with a number of other industrial-
ized countries leads to a less forthright conclu-
sion. Persistent slow growth abroad may have
been due to anti-inflation policies, or perhaps
more likely, tosomecommonoccurrencesuchas
the rising relative price of energy.
Still, studies involving U.S. datahave typical-
ly found that a contractionary monetary and
fiscal policy will reduce output and raise unem-
ployment over a subsequent three-to-five< year
period. Perry (1978) concludes that a contrac-
tionary policy which increased unemployment
by one percentage point will require three years
to shave one percentage pointofftheinflation
rate.26 Perry attributes these long lags torigidi-
ties in nominal wages and prices, slowness in the
adjustment ofexpectations, and the existence of
cost-push factors prolonging inflation.• Conse-
quently, he suggests the need for sotnesortof
incomes policies to retard thecost-pushptocess
and so ameliorate the output costs of slowing
inflation.
Perry's analysis can be questioned onseveral
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points. For one thing, his estimates ofthe length
of the adjustment period following. policy
changes are longer than those in manymonetary
analyses, although his lags are similar to those
found in other studies.27 A more vulnerable
conclusion is his argument that incomes policies
can mitigate the output effects oftighter policy.
Presumably, the wage-price rigidities causing
Perry's long lags could result from monopolistic
behavior by firms and unions. Yet incomes
policies would not directlyattackthese monopo-
ly powers. For example, a union might exert
monopoly power by controlling the supply of
skilled labor that a manufacturer needs, or by
persuading (contractually) a manufacturer to
eschew non-union sources. An incomes policy
might moderate the explicit wage that the union
could charge the manufacturer, butit would not
prevent the union from exploiting its monopoly
power by demanding a myriad of non·wage
benefits, including better health and pension
plans, longer vacations, stricter seniority rules,
etc. These would serve to increase unit labor
costs as much as equivalent wage increases, and
so would have much the same effects on output
and employment under an anti-inflation mone-
tary policy.
Therefore,justas pricecontrolsdonotprevent
queuing and other implicitcostsfrom equilibrat-
ing supply and demand, incomes policies need
not prevent firms or unionsfrom exercisingtheir
monopoly power in other ways. Thus, they may
not help-and may even hurt-the adjustment
process to slow inflation.28 Advocates ofincome
policies virtually ignore these issues, buttheycan
present a damaging argument against the effica-
cy of such policies.
The evidence on balance suggests that a sub-
stantial period of slow growth will follow any
serious attempt to slow the rate of inflation.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether incomes
policies orthe like canshortenthis period. While
theseriousness ofthese outputcostsvaries across
different studies, it would be hopelesslyoptimis-
tic to believe that inflation could· be slowed
without some temporary losses in production
and jobs.V. Stopping Inflation-Odysseus at·the Helm
Our conclusions can be used to discuss three
basic policy issues: I) Should inflation be re-
duced; 2) what instruments should be used in an
anti-inflation policy; and 3) how quickly should
we attempt to slow inflation.
With respect to the desirability of reducing
inflation, a rough cost-benefit calculation canbe
devised. The costs of slowing inflation include
the temporary declines in output and employ-
ment discussed in Section IV. The benefits in-
clude the removal of the recurrent costs of
inflation discussed in Section III.
Perry's (1978) analysis suggests that one
percentage-pointhigherunemploymentfor three
years would be needed to slow inflation by one
percentage point. Even if we assumed that each
unit of labor contributes a constant share to
GNP, these losses in present-value terms amount
to less than a 3-percentreductionin GNPtoslow
inflation by one percentage point. Yet the losses
from the continuing inefficient allocation of
resources ("shoe leather costs," etc.) due to
inflation were estimated at 5 percent ofGNP for
one percentage point of inflation, in present-
value terms.
Consider also the likely sources of error in
these calculations. Again, Perry's lags from tight
policy to lower inflation are longer-and so his
implied output losses from slowing inflation are
higher-than those in monetary analyses of
inflation. Moreover, it may be incorrect to as-
sume that each percentage-point change in un-
employment means a constant one percentage-
point effect on GNP. This assumption abstracts
from the productive input of capital and other
factors in GNP, and also ignores the lower
productivity of marginally employed labor,
which would be the first to becomeunemployed.
Thus, the output costs of slowing inflation are
probably overstated. Itcould be argued in rebut-
tal that the costs ofinflation are also overstated.
However, our calculations included. only effi-
ciency lossesandignoredothercostsofinflation.
Also,a 5-percent after-tax realrate ofreturnwas
usedto obtain our2-percentdiscount rate, which
is absurdly high, and so further understates the
costs of inflation.29
To be sure, these are very rough estimates of
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the costs and benefits of slowing inflation. Ne-
vertheless, they cast substantial doubt on the
argument that inflation is best left alone-that
the "cure is worse than the disease." Moreover,
given ourearlierconclusionthat Federalgovern-
ment and Federal Reserveaetions have been
responsible for much ofthe problem, and given
the public's increasing distaste for inflation, it
would seem incumbent on policymakers to face
up to the task of slowing the price spiral.
If, then, we conclude that a serious attempt
should be made to slow inflation, what instru-
ments should be directed to the task? Ourearlier
analysis clearly implied thatslowergrowthinthe
monetary aggregates is a necessary part of any
anti-inflation strategy. This is true whatever
inflation theory one holds, since no type of
inflation can continue without a sustaining
monetary expansion. Deregulation of various
industries, liberalization of tax laws, or even
lower government spending financed by lower
taxes (leaving money growth unchanged) would
allow one-time declines in the pricelevel, but by
themselves could not permanently overcome
persistent inflation such as the nationhas recent-
ly experienced.
The evidence does not indicate which mone-
tary aggregate the Federal Reserve should focus
on. Mi , M2 and the monetary base all display
similar statistical effects on prices. What would
seem more important is that the FederalReserve
concentrate on a particular aggregate of its
choice and not switch among aggregates when
they give conflicting signals.30 Otherwise, the
Fed might be tempted to choose whichever
aggregate was displaying the most"convenient
signalat a given time.
Actions to reduce government regulations, to
liberalize (or index) tax laws, to reduce protec-
tive tarriffs, and other such moves could help
mitigate the. contractionary effects of slower
money growth, and could also provide a quick
(albeit temporary) reduction in inflation.Thes.e
steps thuscouldserve a useful role inaugmenting
orcomplementingananti-inflationarymonetary
policy. But since these are supplementary ac-
tions, the basic question about them is whether
they would be intrinsically good for the econo-my, rather than how much of a temporary
reduction in inflation they could effect.
A more vital supplementary policy. would
involve lower government spendingand deficits.
As we have seen, federal spending and deficit
increases historically have apparently helped
stimulate monetary expansion through the
monetization of federal debt. A slower money-
growth rate unaccompanied by lower deficits
would eventually depress the whole economy,
but would initially affect housing and sirnilar
sectors most heavily because oftheirvulnerabili-
ty to high interest rates. Lowering the deficit
along with money growth would reduce the
strain on credit markets, and would probably
allow a smoother approach to lower inflation
rates.
A case could be made for incomes policies if
one could show that cost-push factors have
played a major role in generating inflation, but
there is little compelling evidence on that score.
Moreover, there is no evidence that incomes
policies could successfullycountertruemonopo-
ly power wherever such occurs. Finally, history
suggests that incomes policies, when employed,
have tended to license renewed growth in the
money supply.3! The proponents ofsuchpolicies
usually emphasize that they are intended as a
complement to slower money growth. Neverthe-
less, as a practical matter, policymakerstypically
become tempted to expand monetary policy
when incomes policies can be relied uponto hold
down prices temporarily. For these reasons,
incomes policies apparently can do little good
but much harm, and so probably should i>e left
unused in formulating plans to slow inflation.
Finally, how fast should we try to reduce
inflation? Recent historysuggeststhata policyof
rapid reduction in money growth and inflation
cannot be maintained for very long. A drastic
reduction in money growth can cause a quick
and deep recession. Once the resulting llnern-
ployment becomes severe, politicalse~titllent
shifts from concernaboutinflationtoworryover
unemployment. In that situation,policYtnakers
may yield to short-run pressuresandexpandthe
money supply anew. After a briefdecline, infla-
tion would then accelerate once more a.nd the
situationwould becomeas badas (orworsethan)
18
before.
This apparently is what happened in 1974-76.
With inflation at 12 percent in 1974 (see charts),
the decline in M2growth to 7 percent signified
very restrictive policy. This shift, together with
the oil-price hike, plunged the economy into a
deep recession in 1975. But shortly thereafter,
following public consternation over high unem-
ployment, M2 growth began to accelerate
again-and it has since been the prime factor in
causing the currently high rate of U.S. inflation.
In sum, the temporary costs of slowing infla-
tion, and the temptation to avoid these costs
through expansionary means, provide strong
enticements to abandon anti-inflationary
policies-even when theseareseriously installed.
Like the Sirens of the Odyssey, the short-run
trade-offs facing policymakers with short-term
horizons have a call that requires more than
good intentions to resist.32
It would seem that the surest way to reduce
inflation on a permanent basis is to avoid the
large cyclical swings in policy that create swings
in public opinion as well. Thus, the rate of
growth in the FOMC's chosen aggregate should
be lowered slowly, say by 1 to I Y2 percentage
points per year, over a four-to-six year period.33
Though increases in unemployment would stiB
occur, these would be smaller than undera more
drastic policy, and so would be less unpopular.
Of course, the gains in inflation would also
come more slowly. Also, even during a mild
slowdown, policymakers might be tempted to
expand policy and so accelerate output growth.
These pressures are not easy to abide, but they
are nevertheless inevitable under any serious
attempt to slow inflation. Like Odysseus, the
policymaker will have to "tie his hands to the
mast" until the progress of his policy takes him
safely away from the "Siren's calL" Reductions
in inflation come slowly undersucha policy, but
they will not come at all unless the policy is
maintained steadfastlyfor anextended periodof
time. Perhaps the pressuresto"reflate" can be
mitigated by introduction of supplementary
measures such as those discussed above, which
would likely reduce the output costs ofslowing
inflation.
In a sense, sucha policywould involvesomeof
the worst of both worlds. It will not achieve therapid declines in inflation which are politically
desirable, and unfortunately it will create some
losses injobs and productionwhich arepolitical-
ly painful. Yet as we have seen, a "quick fix" to
inflation is unlikely to be maintained, while a
"do-nothing" policy leaves inflationatlevelsthat
increase with each cyclical expansion. A gradual
but steadily maintained attempttoslowinflation
runs the middle ground, and should elicit grow-
ing support as the publicperceives thatitis being
followed. Although not a happy alternative, it
appearsto presentthe bestchoiceavailable to the
Federal Reserve, the Congress, and the Execu-
tive Branch.
FOOTNOTES
1. We say "permanently" here, because temporary
attempts to reduce inflation that are rescinded by
subsequent policy changes would periodically subject
the economy to slow growth and lost jobs every time a
tight policy is imposed.
2. See Schultz (1959), as well as the reference to this
designation in Levy (1979).
3. We say "perceived" monopoly power, because in
many studies it appears to make littledifferencewheth-
er the monopoly power actually exists or not. Given a
slow reaction of demand to higher prices, as well as
downward. price rigidity elsewhere in the economy, a
price increase even in a competitive industry could
generate the type of inflation spiral propounded by
cost-push theorists.
4. As shown in Section II, real-world inflations have
typically been characterized by such general absolute
price increases.
5. In fact, inflation traditionally has been defined as an
increase in the money supply, and only recently have
rising prices been associated with the word. Thus,
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition,
1936, defines inflation as a:
Disproportionate and relatively sharp and sud-
den increase in the quantity of money and
credit, or both, relative to the amount of ex-
change business. Such increasemaycomeas a
result of unexpected additions to the supply of
precious metals, as in the period following the
Spanish conquests in Central and South Ameri-
ca or the period following the opening up of
large new golddeposits; orit maycome in times
of business activity by expansion of credit
through the banks; or it may come in times of
financial difficulty by governmental issues of
paper money without adequate metallic re-
serves and without provisions for conversion
into standard metallic money on demand. In
accordance with the law of the quantity theory
ofmoney, inflation always produces a rise in
the price level.
Whatever the quality of economic analysis in this
definition, it is interesting to note that it describes
inflation as causing an increasing price level. The
definitional association ofinflation with risingprices, as
documented in newer editions of Webster's dictionary,
has apparently arisen in English usage primarily
through historical experience.
6. This assertion embodies the conceptof"neutralityof
money." The idea is thatthenominal supplyofcurrency
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does not intrinsically affect real factors like tastes,
industrial capacity, or demographics, and that a equi-
proportional change in the magnitudes of all nominal
assets and prices would leave real conditions un-
changed. Therefore, in the long run, the level of the
money supply should have no effect on real magni-
tudes, but only on prices.
7. Theoryspecifies that in a full-employmenteconomy,
equal increases in government spending and taxes
would raise prices, mainly because the lower after-tax
level of private wealth would lower money demand.
This higher price level would be consistentwiththefact
that, because of higher government spending, less
goods would be left over for private consumption.
What's more, this is a once-and-for-all increase in the
equilibrium price level, rather than a continuing infla-
tion.
Barro (1974), reflecting David Ricardo, also asserts
that bond finance ofadeficit is merely a substitution of
future taxes for present taxes, since future taxes will
need to be higher in order to service the government
debt. Therefore, bond financing of spending should
have identical effects as tax financing. Bailey (1971, p.
60 ff) and Buchanan (1976) also discuss these issues.
While most economists do not accept this extreme
specification, it'sreasonable to believe that bond issues
do raise expectations of future taxes somewhat, in
which case they would still be less inflationary than
monetization of government debt.
8. For further documentation and discussion of these
analyses, see Levy (1979) or Bronfenbrenner and Holz-
man (1963). Gordon (1977) also discusses the possible
effects of 1973 oil-price increases and crop failures on
prices.
9. It may appear that income-share conflicts and politi-
cal pressures for higher growth and employment are
onlyslightly differentmanifestationsofthesame socio-
logical forces, and that the various theories are there-
fore little different. Nevertheless, the different ap-
proaches to inflation do make a difference, as is
discussed toward the end of the next section.
10. They found a predominantly uniform effect of
inflation on prices in various commodity groups. That
is, movements in the consumer price index hadsyste-
maticeffects onprices in individual commodityclasses
that were generally not significantly different from
unity. Therefore, CPI movements do not appear to be
related systematically to relative price changes. The
exceptions to this result were in the Categories of rent,
homeownership, and utilities prices. These exceptions
were found by the authors to be due tospecial factors,
such as measurement problems (rent), as well as non-market pricing of property taxes (homeownership) and
of government-regulated monopolies (utilities prices).
11. This quantitative result is from Bazdarich (1979). As
for the traditional work on money and prices, two
hallmark works are the empirical studies by various
authors in Friedman (1956) and the study by Friedman
and Schwartz (1963). Importantwork can also befound
in Meiselman (1970) and in a ser.ies of articles by Karl
Brunner and Allan Meltzer, as well as many other
monetary studies. Our emphasis on recent monetary
work is notmeant to downplaythe importanceofearlier
analyses by Clark Warburton, Lloyd Mints, and many
others, but to concentrate on the more sophisticated
statistical analyses of the last twenty years.
12. Early empirical research was donebyMeans (1935),
among others. More recent studies are found in Means
(1972), the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability
(1969), Wachtel and Adelsheim (1976), Eckstein and
Brinner (1972), and Perry (1978). Levy (1979) surveys
most of these results.
13. Gordon's technique used a Granger causality-test
which measured the effects of wages on money-supply
growth at lags of one to fourquarters. Only at the third
lag was the estimated effect significant for the U.S.
Taken as a whole, these results did not show a signifi-
cant effect. The one significant lag would be reliable
evidence only if Gordon were testing the hypothesis
that wages affect money at the third lag and at noother.
The weaker hypothesis,thatwages havesomeeffecton
money, however, is not supported by these results; that
is, its alternative hypothesisthatwages have no general
effect is not refuted by this evidence.
14. While it's true that world crop failures occurred in
1973 and that oil prices jumped astronomically in 1974,
it's also true that monetary expansion accelerated in
1971-72 in the U.S. and elsewhere. Also, in the U.S.,
price controls in 1971-73 served to suppress much of
the inflationary pressure of this fast money growth,
postponing it until after the controls were lifted in mid-
1973. Bazdarich (1979) estimates that most of the
inflation postponed by the controls should have oc-
curred by late 1975. Consequently, he estimates the
consumer price level for late 1975 using only money-
supply data through 1975. This estimate differed from
the actual price level by only three percentage points,
suggesting that money-supply behavior could explain
much of the total movements in prices over that four-
year period.
15. Though government spending had significant ef-
fects on money-supply growth, the effects did not
become positive until the fifth-quarter lag. Yef()ne
would expect spending financed by money creation to
have a much quicker effect on the money supply.
Similarly, for statistical reasons (the use of seasonally
adjusted data), the results forthe effects ofthe govern-
ment deficit on the money supply, though ostensibly
significant, may not be reliable. See Bazdarich (1979)
for details.
16. As evidence of the empirical importance of these
phenomena, Gorham (1979) points to a 7-percentde-
cline in real balances (i.e., the M1 moneysupplydeflat-
ed by prices) in the U.S. over the period 1973-78.
Keynesian economists have generally taken this as a
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sign of tight monetary policy over this period (e.g.,
Heller 1977 and Ackley 1979). Yet over such a long
period of time, with the large price-level increases
experienced, it seems more realistic to regard this
phenomenon as largely induced by thedemandfor real
balances. Thus, in a period where real GNP. grew 20
percent, which by itself would suggest a rise in real-
balance demand, the acceleration in inflation and in
inflation expectations apparently led to a much larger
drop in real-balance demand than would haveoccurred
otherwise. Using regression analysis, Gorham also
finds systematic evidence that inflation has lowered
real balances (demanded) in the U.S. economy.
17. If an acceleration in inflation meant thatthe average
rate of inflation increased, but that the variability of
inflation around that average stayed much the same,
then inflation would not imply an increase in uncertain-
ty. In fact, however, the historical incidence of inflation
is as described in the text. Sjaastad (1975) presents a
theoretical explanation of this coincidence in the mean
and variability of inflation.
18. Rose obtains the 2-percent discount rate in the
following manner: He assumes a 5-percent after-tax
real rate ofreturn (clearlyavery high estimate) and then
subtracts an assumed 3-percent annual rise in "shoe
leather" costs, reflecting a 3-percent expected annual
rise in real GNP. Thus, present costs should be dis-
counted at a 2-percent (5-3) rate. A lower real rate of
return would result in a lower discount rate, which
would result in even higher present values of these
shoe-leather costs for each percentage point of infla-
tion.
19. Tobin (1965) analyzed the general effects of infla-
tion on growth. Using a consumption function that
depended on the rate of inflation, rather than prices, he
reached a presumption that inflation speeds growth.
Sidrauski (1967), using utility maximization to derive
consumption behavior, found no such effect. These
and other studies are summarized in Dornbusch and
Frenkel (1973).
20. Suppose a unit ofcapital yields a real rate of return r
based on productivity, depreciation, etc. With an infla-
tion rate 11', the price of the good that the unit ofcapital
produces wil rise, as will thenominal value ofthecapital
itself. Abstracting from relative pricechanges, then, the
combination of real returns and inflation premiasum to
a total pre-tax nominal rate of return ofr+rr, so thatthe
pre-tax real rate of return (r+rr-rr = r) is unchanged by
inflation. However, the inflation premia and the real
return are both treated as income and so taxedby the
government. With a tax rate t, then, the after-tax nomi-
nal rate of return is (l-tHr+rrl. Ifwethen subtraCt therate
of inflation, the after-tax real rate--or the effective
rate-of return of capital is (l-t)r-rrt, which declines as
inflation rises (or 11' increasesl. Thus, because ofthe tax
on inflationary capital gains, effective returns tocapital
will fall as inflation rises, thusdiscouraging investment.
Of course, the investorcan postpone payment of these
inflationary capital gains, but he must eventually pay
them.
21. The Council of Economic Advisors (1979) itself has
recognized a slowdown in the U.S. sustainable rate of
growth. The Council cites as contributing factors the
declines in productivity growth and in research anddevelopment, both of which clearly could be reactions
to unfavorable changes in after-tax returns due to
higher inflation.
22. Discussion of these and other points in this section
can be found in McElhattan (1979) and in Pigott(1979).
23. See Phelps et al. (1970) for seminal work on the
expectations explanation of the Phillips curve.
24. In this respect, the existence of long-termcontracts
and other fixed commitments could allow unemploy-
ment to differfrom the natural rate forawhileeven after
expectations adjust. See Poole (1974) as well as McEI-
hattan (1979). By the same token, however, these
factors could also be seen as sources ofchanges in the
natural rate.
25. Also, see Gordon (1976) fora detailed survey of the
theory and evidence on the Phillips Curve.
26. This estimate is provided by William Poole, in the
discussion following Perry (1978): "If Perry's estimates
are taken at face value, a monetary policy that kept the
unemployment rate 1 percentage point above the natu-
ral rate would be consistent with a decline in the
inflation rate by 0.3 percentage point each year."
27. In Perry's analysis, the lag from unemployment to
inflation is based on a "mainline" structural model
involving aggregate demand, supply, etc. Policy vari-
ables affect inflation and unemployment in this model
only through their effect on aggregate demand and
supply. This framework is unquestionably correct in
theory, but such an indirect method of estimation
conceivably could bias the estimated reduced-form
effects of the money supply on inflation and unemploy-
ment. That is, if Perry's hypothesized reduction in
unemployment is to be effected through slower money
growth, it's likely that adirect, reduced-form estimation
of the effects of money on inflation and unemployment
would produce shorter estimates of the lags than are
contained in Perry's analysis. This is because the
reduced-form effects are combinations of a number of
structural effects. By estimating each structural effect
individually, Perry may be introducing extra sources of
error in estimating the reduced form than if he had
estimated it directly. Thus, Bazdarich (1979), for exam-
ple, finds much shorter lags from moneyto inflation and
unemployment. The latter are more consistent than
Perry's with the common "monetarist" dictum that
slower money supply growth will affect inflation with a
lag of generally two years.
28. Incomes polices could hurtthe adjustment process
because the fringe benefits or tie-in schemes unions
and firms might pursue are generally inefficient means
of exploiting market power, compared to explicit wage
or price increases. Thus, by fostering inefficient,
second-best types of arragements, the effects of mo-
nopoly power could be even worse under incomes
policies.
29. See footnote 18 for details.
30. The question arises as to whether current Federal
Reserve operating procedures should be relied upon to
effect this slower growth in the FOMC's chosen aggre-
gate, and/or what alternative operating procedures
would be suitable. These questions are addressed in
Judd and Scadding's article in this issue of the Review.
31. In the United States, money-supply growth actually
declined in 1970 and early 1971, but then accelerated
shortly after the imposition of price controls in August
1971. At the presenttime, also, itwould be hard toargue
that the Administration's wage-price guidelines have
induced any significant slowing in the growth of M1 or
M2.
32. In Homer's Odyssey, Odysseusand his men prepare
to pass through the straits of the Sirens, whose call no
man can resist. He ties rags around his men's ears so
that they won't be able to hear. Since someone must be
available to signal to his men when it is safe, he leaves
his own ears unbound, but has his arms tied tightly to
the ship's mast, where he has to endure the agony of
being unable to answer the Siren's call.
33. At present, underlying rates of change appear to be
about 7 percent for M1 and 9 percent for M2, although
historically M2 has tended to grow about 3 percentage
points faster than M1. Also, available existing money-
price evidence suggests thatgrowth rates ofzero for M1
and 3 percent for M2 are roughly consistent with the 3-
percent per year inflation suggested by the Humphrey-
Hawkins bill. Therefore, if we take this level as a goal,
and reduce M1 and/orM2 growth by 1to 1%percentage
points a year, zero M1 growth and 3-percent M2 growth
would be achieved in four to six years, with 3 percent
CPI inflation achieved in about six to eight years.
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